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Abstract A standard method to elicit certainty equivalents is the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) procedure. We compare the standard BDM procedure and a BDM
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state. We find that elicited prices are systematically affected by the range of feasible
minimum selling prices. Expected utility theory cannot explain these results. Non-
expected utility theories can only explain the results if subjects consider compound
lotteries generated by the BDM procedure. We present an alternative explanation
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A standard method to elicit the certainty equivalent of a risky lottery is the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure proposed by Becker et al. (1964). Under the
BDM procedure, individuals are asked to state their minimum selling price for a
risky lottery. The experimenter then draws a random number between the lowest and
the highest outcome of the lottery. If the price that the individual states is lower than
or equal to the drawn number, she receives the drawn number as her payoff. Other-
wise she has to play the risky lottery. If preferences satisfy the independence axiom,
decisions are not affected by errors, and the reduction-of-compound-lotteries axiom
holds, then the BDM procedure elicits the correct certainty equivalent of the lottery.
It is well-known that the BDM procedure does not necessarily provide the correct
incentives to reveal the certainty equivalent if preferences violate the independence
axiom and individuals take the compound lotteries into account, which they face
in a BDM-task (e.g., Karni and Safra 1987). However, if subjects do not consider
compound lotteries, the BDM procedure elicits the true certainty equivalents even if
the underlying preferences can not be represented by an expected utility functional.
Starmer and Sugden (1991) were the first to provide convincing experimental evi-
dence that in binary choice tasks subjects evaluate risky lotteries in isolation and that
they ignore the compound lotteries that are generated by the random lottery incentive
scheme.
In the BDM-procedure, subjects can usually state any price (or at least any price
between the lowest and the highest outcome of the lottery). However, in many pricing
decisions exist some upper or lower limits on the possible prices. These limits can be
explicit (e.g., the reservation price or the current bid in an auction) or implicit (e.g.
the price of the item under consideration at a different firm or the budget constraint).
There exists a large literature on range effects that documents how limits affect
prices. To study the effects of limits on prices, we analyze pricing decisions in the
standard BDM-task and in a modification of the standard BDM-task—the restricted
BDM-task. In a restricted BDM-task, subjects can only state selling prices which lie
in an interval that is symmetric around the expected value of the lottery and which
includes either the highest or the lowest outcome of the lottery (whichever is closer to
the expected value). Similar to the standard BDM-procedure, the random number that
is used to determine payoffs in the restricted BDM-task is drawn from the interval of
feasible selling prices. Note that a price outside this interval would yield the same
distribution of payoffs as a price that is equal to the closest bound of the interval.
If subjects use the same procedure to price lotteries in the restricted and the stan-
dard BDM-task, then the elicited prices should be consistent in the following sense.
If preferences are deterministic, a subject who states a minimum selling price in the
standard BDM-task, which is inside the feasible interval of selling prices in the re-
stricted BDM-task, should state the same price in the restricted BDM-task. Other-
wise, the price that she states in the restricted BDM-task should be equal to the clos-
est bound of the interval of feasible prices. If subjects have stochastic preferences,
then the percentage of prices that are outside or equal to the bounds in the standard
BDM-task should not be statistically different from the percentage of prices that are
equal to the bound in the restricted BDM-task.
We run an experiment to compare elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-
tasks. Our results can be summarized as follows. The repeated elicitation of minimum
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selling prices via the standard BDM procedure shows that only 16.7% of subjects
consistently state the same minimum selling price for identical lotteries. This indi-
cates that elicited prices are quite stochastic.
A comparison of prices that are elicited in standard and restricted BDM-tasks
shows that subjects do not evaluate risky lotteries in isolation. Instead, elicited prices
are strongly affected by the interval from which the subject has to choose a price and
from which the random number is drawn. This effect depends on the characteristics of
the lottery. In a standard BDM-task, subjects state systematically higher (lower) min-
imum selling prices than in a restricted BDM-task if a two-outcome lottery delivers
the highest outcome with probability lower (higher) than 0.5.
The standard and the restricted BDM-task differ with respect to:
– the interval from which the random number is drawn that determines payoffs
– the range of feasible selling prices that subjects can state.
Hence we analyze two possible explanations:
1. Since the interval from which the random number is drawn differs, subjects face
different compound lotteries even if they state the same price in the standard and
the restricted BDM-task. If subjects take compound lotteries into account, selling
prices can differ across tasks.
2. Since the range of feasible prices differs, range effects can possibly explain the
results.
We propose a model of Stochastic Pricing that offers an intuitive explanation for
range effects and that explains the systematic differences between prices in standard
and restricted BDM-tasks. We consider subjects whose preferences are described by
a random utility model. Subjects determine the minimum selling price of a lottery
via a sequence of hypothetical binary comparisons between the lottery and different
monetary amounts. Depending on whether the amount or the lottery is preferred,
the subject decreases or increases the amount to which the lottery is compared. The
sequence of comparisons stops if the preferred alternative switches. The selling price
that subjects state is the average of the last two amounts to which the lottery has been
compared. This model predicts range effects because subjects compare the lottery
only to outcomes that are indeed feasible selling prices.
Our model provides an intuitive explanation for the difference in prices across
standard and restricted BDM-tasks and for the typical fourfold pattern of risk-
attitudes (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In a companion paper, Blavatskyy and
Köhler (2007) test the procedural assumptions of the proposed model of stochas-
tic pricing. Blavatskyy and Köhler (2007) analyze how subjects adjust their stated
minimum selling prices under time pressure. They show that the observed price ad-
justment patterns look exactly like the patterns that are predicted by our stochastic
pricing model.
The idea of hypothetical comparisons between the lottery and monetary amounts
is similar to the computational model of Johnson and Busemeyer (2005). In their
model, pricing a lottery involves a candidate search module (that determines which
amount is compared to the lottery) and a comparison module (that specifies how the
lottery is compared to the amount). Subjects compare a lottery with an amount via
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evaluating a sequence of hypothetical plays of the lottery. This generates a discrete
Markov chain. Subjects declare indifference or preference for one of the alternatives
if the Markov process crosses the respective thresholds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes design,
implementation and results of the experiment. Section 2 tests the predictions of dif-
ferent decision theories. Section 3 concludes.
1 Experimental design and results
1.1 Lotteries
We used 15 risky lotteries that are shown in Table 1. All lotteries have only two
outcomes and the lowest outcome is zero. Lotteries 1–3 are the same as in Harbaugh
et al. (2003), except that payoffs are in Swiss Francs (CHF) and multiplied by 3.5.
Lotteries 4–15 are the same as in lottery set I from Tversky et al. (1990), except
that payoffs are in CHF and multiplied by 10. One CHF was approximately $0.83 or
€0.61 at the time of the experiment.
Risky lotteries were described and subsequently played out in terms of the num-
ber of red and black cards in a box that contains 100 cards. If the subject drew a
black card, she would receive zero. If she drew a red card, she would receive the
highest outcome of the lottery. We used a bar to represent the proportion of red and
black cards graphically on the computer screen. We used color coding to distinguish
different tasks.
1.2 Elicitation of minimum selling prices
Subjects were asked twice to state a price for each of the 15 lotteries in Table 1. One
price was elicited in a standard BDM-task. The other price was elicited in a restricted
BDM-task.
In a standard BDM-task, subjects were endowed with a lottery and they were asked
to enter a minimum selling price for the lottery. A screenshot of the standard BDM-
task for lottery L1 is shown on the left hand side of Fig. 1. If a standard BDM-task
was selected to determine the payoff, a random number was drawn from the interval
between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery. If the subject stated a price
higher than the randomly drawn number, she would play the lottery. Otherwise she
would sell the lottery and receive an amount equal to the randomly drawn number.
Table 1 Lotteries used in the experiment (outcomes are in CHF)
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 L15
Outcome x1 70 70 70 40 160 20 90 30 65 40 400 25 85 20 50
Probability p1 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.97 0.31 0.81 0.19 0.94 0.5 0.89 0.11 0.94 0.39 0.92 0.5
Outcome x2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probability p2 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.03 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.06 0.5 0.11 0.89 0.06 0.61 0.08 0.5
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Fig. 1 Screenshots of standard and restricted BDM-tasks (translated from German)
In a restricted BDM-task, subjects were endowed with a lottery and they were
asked to enter a selling price. Subjects could only enter prices from a specified in-
terval. For all lotteries we used the interval [max{0,2p1x1 − x1},min{2p1x1, x1}],
which is symmetric around the expected value of the lottery and includes either the
lowest or the highest outcome. A screenshot of the restricted BDM-task for lottery
L3 is shown on the right hand side of Fig. 1. If one of the restricted BDM-tasks was
selected to determine the earnings, a random number was drawn from the specified
interval. If the subject stated a price higher than the drawn number, she would play
the lottery. Otherwise she would sell the lottery and receive an amount equal to the
drawn number.
1.3 Implementation of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zürich. Sixty undergraduates
(35 male and 25 female) from a variety of majors participated in the experiment. The
average age was 22. There were two sessions with 30 subjects in each session. At the
beginning of the experiment, subjects received a copy of the instructions. Instructions
included screenshots for the different tasks. Additionally, the experimenter read aloud
the instructions. The experiment lasted about 45 minutes (plus 30 minutes to explain
the instructions). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Each subject faced lotteries L1–L15 in a standard and a restricted BDM-task.
These decision problems were presented to subjects in random order intermixed with
42 other decision problems that will be analyzed elsewhere. There was no time re-
striction for decision problems and each subject could continue the experiment at her
own pace.
We used a random lottery incentive scheme and physical randomization devices.
At the end of the experiment each subject drew a card from a box with cards num-
bered from 1 to 72 (total number of decision problems). The number on the card
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determined the decision problem which was used to compute the payoff of the sub-
ject. If the subject had to play a risky lottery, she had to draw a second card from a box
with a specified distribution of red and black cards (we used standard playing cards).
Subjects drew the second card outside the main laboratory to preserve the anonymity
of payments.
Subjects received a 10 CHF show-up fee and whatever they earned in the exper-
iment. Average earnings were 43.9 CHF (approx. $36 or €27). The lowest earning
was 10 CHF, the highest was 133.8 CHF. At the end of the experiment, the subjects
were asked to complete a short socio-demographic questionnaire.
1.4 Results
We begin with the overall consistency of subjects’ responses. The restricted and stan-
dard BDM-tasks are equivalent for lotteries that involve 50%–50% chances. There-
fore, we use lotteries L9 and L15 to check the individual consistency of responses.
Subjects with deterministic preferences (that are not affected by noise) should state
identical minimum selling prices for lotteries L9 and L15 in the standard and re-
stricted BDM-task. Only 10 subjects (16.7%) showed such consistency for both lot-
teries. In 40.8% of cases subjects stated identical minimum selling prices for one of
the lotteries (L9 or L15) in standard and restricted BDM-tasks.
We are not aware of any studies that report consistency rates for minimum sell-
ing prices. However, we find that our consistency rate for minimum selling prices is
significantly lower than consistency rates reported in the literature for binary choice
tasks. For example, Hey and Orme (1994) and Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report
that only 25% and 20.8% of decisions in binary choice tasks are reversed if subjects
face the same decision problem for a second time.
We now investigate if the restrictions on feasible prices in a BDM-task have any
effect on the elicited prices. We exclude lotteries L9 and L15 from the current analysis
because standard and restricted BDM-tasks are identical for these two lotteries.
Most experimental studies assume that subjects ignore compound lotteries in pric-
ing tasks. Hence as benchmark, consider subjects who ignore compound lotteries. In
this case, the fraction of subjects whose minimum selling price for a lottery is out-
side the interval of feasible prices in the restricted BDM-task is the same as in the
corresponding standard BDM-task. Hence the fraction who state a price equal to the
bound in the restricted BDM-task is the same as the fraction who state a price outside
the interval of feasible prices or equal to the bound in the standard BDM-task.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the experiment. For all lotteries, except L12, the
number of subjects, who state a price in the standard BDM-task that lies outside or
Table 2 Number of subjects who state a price outside or equal to the bound of the interval of feasible
prices used in the restricted BDM
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 Sum
Standard BDM 35 1 8 21 10 8 16 22 21 22 17 2 14 197
Restricted BDM 12 1 8 9 2 4 2 10 7 7 18 0 4 84
338 P.R. Blavatskyy, W.R. Köhler
Fig. 2 Selling prices stated by each subject for lottery L1(70,0.1;0,0.9)
on the bounds of the feasible interval (2nd row in Table 2), is higher than the number
of subjects, who state a price in the restricted BDM-task that is equal to the bound of
the feasible interval (3rd row in Table 2). If subjects used the same method to price
lotteries in both BDM-tasks, then the numbers in the second and third row of Table 2
would be the same. Hence, Table 2 suggests that prices elicited through a restricted
BDM-task are qualitatively different from those elicited in a standard BDM-task.
Figure 2 shows for each subject the prices in the standard and the restricted BDM-
task for lottery L1. In the restricted BDM-task, subjects can state only prices in the
interval [0,14]. Suppose that subjects ignore compound lotteries. If subjects have
deterministic preferences, then all elicited price combinations would lie on the solid
line. In other words, if the subject states a price in the standard BDM-task that lies
in the interval [0,14], then she states the same price in the restricted BDM-task. If
the price in the standard BDM-task is not in the interval [0,14], then the price in the
restricted BDM-task is equal to 14. For 26 out of 60 subjects (43%), prices for lottery
L1 are consistent (i.e., price combinations are located on the solid line in Fig. 2).
If subjects are heterogeneous and have stochastic preferences, then an equal per-
centage of price combinations should lie to the left and to the right of the solid line.
29 subjects stated a price in the restricted BDM-task that was smaller than the upper
bound of the interval and stated a higher price in the standard BDM-task. But only 5
subjects stated a higher price in the restricted BDM-task than in the standard BDM-
task. We can strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (χ2 = 9.676 and
p = 0.0018). This striking asymmetry is also observed for the other lotteries where
the probability of the highest outcome is less than 0.5.
The opposite asymmetry is observed for lotteries where the probability of the high-
est outcome is higher than 0.5. For example, Fig. 3 shows the prices that subjects
state in standard and restricted BDM-tasks for lottery L10. In the restricted BDM-
task, subjects can state only prices in the interval [31.2,40]. For 23 out of 60 subjects
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Fig. 3 Selling prices stated by each subject for lottery L10(40,0.89;0,0.11)
(38.3%), prices are consistent (i.e., price combinations are located on the solid line
in Fig. 3). 30 subjects state a price in the restricted BDM-task that is higher than the
lower bound and higher than the price elicited in the standard BDM-task. But only 7
subjects state a higher price in the standard BDM-task. Again, we can strongly reject
the null hypo-thesis of equal proportions (χ2 = 7.913 and p = 0.0049). We observe a
similar asymmetry for the other lotteries where the probability of the highest outcome
is higher than 0.5.
Our results show that subjects tend to state a higher (lower) price in the restricted
BDM-task than in the standard BDM-task if the probability of the highest outcome
is higher (lower) than 0.5. Thus, there is a systematic discrepancy between the prices
that are elicited in restricted and standard BDM-tasks.
2 Theoretical predictions
2.1 Aversion to state bounds and the certainty effect
Before we analyze the predictions of different decision theories, we briefly discuss
two possible explanations for the experimental results:
(1) subjects are averse to state bounds
(2) the certainty effect.
(1) Aversion to state bounds refers to the observation that subjects are reluctant
to take actions which are extreme relative to the set of feasible actions and instead
take some action which is slightly less extreme. In the context of BDM-tasks, this
implies that subjects might be reluctant to state one of the bounds of the interval of
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Table 3 Number of subjects who state a price outside the interval of feasible prices or within 10% of the
relevant bound used in the restricted BDM
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 Sum
Standard BDM 35 3 8 22 12 10 16 22 24 24 17 10 21 224
Restricted BDM 13 2 8 11 4 7 8 13 11 13 18 7 13 128
feasible prices (even if the bound is their preferred price). Therefore, they state a price
close to (but not equal to) the bound. In the standard BDM-task, the bounds of the
interval of feasible prices are equal to the lowest and highest outcome of the lottery.
In the restricted BDM-task, the interval of feasible prices is symmetric around the
expected value and one of the bounds is equal to the lowest or highest outcome of the
lottery (whichever is closer to the expected value). To analyze whether aversion to
state bounds can explain the experimental results, we consider the bound that differs
between the standard and restricted BDM-tasks.
To formalize the idea that subjects are reluctant to state a price equal to the bound
and state instead a price close to the bound, we consider prices that differ from the
bound by at most 10% of the length of the interval of feasible prices in the restricted
BDM-task. Row 2 in Table 3 contains the number of prices elicited in standard BDM-
tasks that lie outside the interval or differ from the bound by at most 10% of the length
of the interval. Row 3 in Table 3 contains the number of prices elicited in restricted
BDM-tasks that differ from the bound by at most 10% of the length of the interval.
Table 3 shows the same discrepancy between the elicited prices as Table 2 does,
although the differences between row 2 and 3 are smaller (as one would expect since
in the standard BDM-task fewer prices lie in the interval than in the restricted BDM-
task). Hence, if aversion to state bounds plays a role at all, it can only explain a
small part of the discrepancy between the elicited prices in standard and restricted
BDM-tasks.
(2) The certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) refers to the observation
that people seem to overweight outcomes that are certain, relative to outcomes that
are merely probable. In the context of our experiment, two prices result in certain
outcomes. If the subject states a price equal to the lower bound of the interval of
feasible prices, she sells the lottery for sure. If she states a price equal to the upper
bound, she plays the lottery for sure. In the restricted BDM-task, one of the bounds
differs from the bounds in the standard BDM-task. According to the certainty effect,
the percentage of prices in the restricted BDM-task that are equal to this bound should
be larger than the percentage of prices that are equal to the bound or outside the
feasible interval in the standard BDM-task. Inspection of Table 2 shows immediately
that this is not the case.
Of course, this does not imply that aversion to state bounds or the certainty effect
do not affect the prices that subjects state in this experiment. However, aversion to
state bounds and the certainty effect can neither alone nor in combination explain the
discrepancy between the elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze expected utility theory (EUT) as
benchmark and show that EUT cannot explain the data. Then we discuss two pos-
sible explanations of the results: compound lotteries and range effects.
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2.2 Expected utility theory
According to EUT, the utility of a lottery L(x1,p1;0,1 − p1) is p1u(x1), where
u : R → R is a non-decreasing Bernoulli utility function that is normalized so that
u(0) = 0. The certainty equivalent CEL of L is implicitly defined by u(CEL) =
p1u(x1).
Consider a standard BDM-task. A subject who states a minimum selling price
x ∈ [0, x1] for lottery L faces a compound lottery that yields the simple lottery L
with probability x/x1 (i.e., when the number that is drawn at random from the inter-
val [0, x1] is smaller or equal to x). Additionally, the compound lottery yields every
outcome in the interval [x, x1] with equal probability. A subject, who states a min-
imum selling price x, obtains utility US(x) = (x/x1)p1u(x1) + (1/x1)
∫ x1
x
u(y)dy.
The price xS that maximizes US is the solution to dUS(x)/dx = 0. Hence u(xS) =
p1u(x1). Thus, xS = CEL and expected utility maximizers reveal their certainty
equivalent in a standard BDM-task.
In a restricted BDM-task, subjects can only state prices in the interval [x, x¯], where
x = x1 max{0,2p1 − 1} and x¯ = x1 min{2p1,1} are the bounds of the interval of
feasible prices. A subject, who states price x for lottery L, faces a compound lottery
that yields the simple lottery L with probability (x − x)/(x¯ − x). Additionally, the
compound lottery yields every outcome in the interval [x, x¯] with equal probability.
If a subject states price x, the utility of the compound lottery is
UR(x) = (x − x) · p1u(x1) +
∫ x¯
x
u(y)dy
x¯ − x .
If there exists xR ∈ [x, x¯] such that dUR(xR)/dx = 0, then xR is the price that
maximizes UR . Hence u(xR) = p1u(x1) and, therefore, xR = CEL. If there exists no
xR ∈ [x, x¯] such that dUR(xR)/dx = 0, then there are two cases. If p1 < 1/2, then x
is equal to the lowest outcome of the lottery and dUR(x)/dx > 0 for every x ∈ [x, x¯].
Hence the price xR that maximizes UR is equal to x¯. If p1 > 1/2, then x¯ is equal to
the highest outcome of the lottery and dUR(x)/dx < 0 for every x ∈ [x, x¯]. Hence
the pricexR that maximizes UR is equal to x.
Thus, in a restricted BDM-task expected utility maximizers state a price that is
equal to their certainty equivalent if the certainty equivalent lies in interval [x, x¯].
Otherwise, they state the price 2x1p1 if p1 < 1/2 and (2p1 − 1)x1 if p1 > 1/2.
We are interested to test whether a stochastic version of EUT can explain the dis-
crepancy of elicited prices in the restricted and the standard BDM-tasks. We consider
heterogeneous subjects who have stochastic preferences where each preference rela-
tion can be described by EUT. To test the predictions of EUT, we compute a sample
of prices that are predicted by EUT for the restricted BDM-task. To compute the sam-
ple of predicted prices, we take the prices that are elicited in the standard BDM-task
and replace prices that lie outside the interval of feasible prices with the respective
bound and leave the other prices unchanged.
We compare the elicited and predicted prices for each subject and each lottery.
Predicted prices are generated by applying the prediction of EUT. It follows imme-
diately that according to EUT, for each subject and for each lottery, the probability
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Table 4 Results of a sign test of the prediction of expected utility theory
Lotteries with p1 < 1/2 Lotteries with p1 > 1/2
Actual price is above predicted 25.8% 39.8%
Actual price is below predicted 46.7% 19.3%
p-value for sign test 0.000 0.000
that the predicted price is smaller than the elicited price in the restricted BDM-task
is equal to the probability that the predicted price is larger than the elicited price. We
use a sign-test to analyze how predicted and elicited prices differ. For each subject
and lottery, we compute the difference between the elicited price in the restricted
BDM-task and the predicted price according to EUT. The null-hypothesis is that the
differences are drawn from a distribution with median zero.
Table 4 summarizes the results. The second and third row of Table 4 show the per-
centage of elicited prices in a restricted BDM-task that are higher and lower than the
predicted price. The sign-test shows that we can reject the null-hypothesis that it is
equally likely that the price elicited in a restricted BDM-task is smaller respectively
larger than the predicted price. For lotteries with p1 < 1/2 (p1 > 1/2), minimum
selling prices stated in a restricted BDM-task are systematically below (above) pre-
dicted prices.
Table 4 shows that we can reject EUT as explanation for the discrepancy between
elicited prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. Furthermore, we can also re-
ject any other decision theory that predicts the same consistency of selling prices in
standard and restricted BDM-tasks.
2.3 Rank-dependent utility theory (RDEU) and cumulative prospect theory
If preferences violate the independence axiom and subjects take compound lotter-
ies into account, then optimal prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks can differ
systematically. In this section, we investigate the predictions of one popular gener-
alization of expected utility theory that does not assume independence—the rank-
dependent utility model (RDEU) proposed by Quiggin (1981). The predictions of
RDEU coincide with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992) when all lottery outcomes are above or equal to the reference point.
According to RDEU, the utility of lottery L(x1,p1;0,1 − p1) is w(p1) · u(x1),
where w : [0,1] → [0,1] is a non-decreasing probability weighting function that sat-
isfies w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. The certainty equivalent CEL is implicitly defined by
u(CEL) = w(p1) · u(x1).
An individual who states a minimum selling price x in a standard BDM-task
obtains utility URDEUS (x) = w(p1x/x1) · u(x1) +
∫ x1
x
w′(1 − y/x1 + p1x/x1) ×
u(y)dy. The minimum selling price xS which maximizes URDEUS is the solution
to dURDEUS (x)/dx = 0. An individual who states a minimum selling price x in a re-
stricted BDM-task obtains utility URDEUR (x) = w(x−xx¯−x p1)u(x1) +∫ x¯
x
w′( x¯−y+p1(x−x)
x¯−x )u(y)dy. Let xR ∈ [x, x¯] be the price that maximizes URDEUR .
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Fig. 4 Scatterplot of the estimated parameters of RDEU (N = 60) if subjects take compound lotteries into
account
We estimated the parameters of RDEU separately for each subject using util-
ity function u(x) = xα and probability weighting function w(p) = pγ /(pγ +
(1 − p)γ )1/γ . The coefficients α and γ are estimated to minimize the weighted sum
of squared errors SSE = ∑15i=1[(xiS − DiS)/xi1]2 +
∑15
i=1[(xiR − DiR)/xi1]2, where DiS
and DiR are the prices that a subject stated for lottery i in a standard and restricted
BDM-tasks and xiS and x
i
R are the corresponding predictions of RDEU. Non-linear
unconstrained optimization was implemented in the Matlab 7.2 package (based on
the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm).
Figure 4 shows the scatterplot of the estimated parameters of RDEU for all 60
subjects. Median estimated parameters are α = 1.10 and γ = 0.94. 42 out of 60 sub-
jects (70%) have a typical inverse S-shaped weighting function (γ < 1) and 22 out
of 60 subjects (37%) have a typical concave utility function (α < 1). For 12 sub-
jects (20%) the estimated coefficients are in the range of typical parameterizations
of RDEU i.e. 0 < α < 1 (concave utility function) and 0 < γ < 1 (inverse S-shaped
weighting function), shown as a shaded area in Fig. 4. For a majority of subjects,
the estimated parameters of RDEU lie outside the range of typical parameterizations.
This finding is not surprising because we assume that subjects take compound lot-
teries into account. In contrast, RDEU is typically estimated on the assumption that
subjects ignore compound lotteries.
2.4 A model of stochastic pricing
In this section, we propose an alternative explanation for the discrepancy of prices in
standard and restricted BDM-tasks. We analyze a model of stochastic pricing where
individuals compare the lottery to different monetary amounts to determine the min-
imum selling price. This model offers a behavioral foundation of range effects.
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In Sect. 1.4, we have shown that the consistency rates of elicited selling prices for
identical lotteries are quite low. To account for low consistency rates, we consider
individuals with stochastic preferences. Each individual is characterized by a set 
of rational preference relations on the space of lotteries and a probability measure η
on . Preferences are described by a pair (η,). If an individual faces a binary
choice problem, she draws a preference relation ρ∈  according to η and chooses
according to the realized ρ . To determine the minimum selling price of a lottery,
the individual compares the lottery to different monetary amounts which are drawn
from the set of possible prices SL.
In a standard BDM-task, the set of possible prices is the interval between the
lowest and the highest outcome. Hence, for lottery L(x1,p1;0,1−p1) we have SL =
[0, x1]. Wilcox (1994, p. 318) provides evidence that subjects search between the
highest and the lowest outcome of a lottery to find their minimum selling price in a
standard BDM-task. In a restricted BDM-task, the set of possible prices is equal to
the interval of feasible prices.
To find the minimum selling price of lottery L, individuals first draw an amount
x ∈ SL at random. In the second step, they draw a preference relation ρ∈  accord-
ing to probability measure η and compare x to the lottery L. If x ∼ρ L then x is stated
as the minimum selling price of L. If x ρ L, then step 2 is repeated with x being
replaced by max{x − , min SL}, where  > 0 is the step size by which the amount
is adjusted. If L ρ x, then step 2 is repeated with x being replaced by min{x + ,
max SL}. Note that individuals draw a new preference relation each time when they
compare a lottery to a monetary amount. The sequence of binary comparisons ends
if the preferred alternative switches. In this case, the minimum selling price is the
average of the last two amounts to which the lottery has been compared.
For example, consider an individual who prices the lottery L(70,0.1;0,0.9). The
set of possible prices is [0,70]. Suppose that the individual starts the sequence of bi-
nary comparisons with x = 20 and the step size is  = 5. If x  L, she then compares
the lottery with x = 15. If she still prefers x, in the next step she compares the lottery
with x = 10. If she now prefers the lottery over x = 10, she states a minimum selling
of 12.5.
The stochastic pricing model describes the determination of the minimum selling
price as a grid search where the lottery is compared to different monetary amounts.
If individuals use such a simple grid search, then the price that an individual states
in a standard and restricted BDM-task can be described as random variable whose
distribution depends on the probability measure η over preference relations, on the
step-size , and the set of possible prices SL. Consider the simplest possible case of
a two outcome lottery L(x1,p1;0,1 − p1) when individuals are “on average” risk
neutral, i.e. they are just as likely to choose amount p1x1 − δ over lottery L as they
are likely to choose L over amountp1x1 + δ. In this case, the median selling price
in a restricted BDM-task is just the expected value p1x1 of the lottery. However,
the median selling price in a standard BDM-task is higher (lower) than the expected
value of the lottery for lotteries with p1 < 1/2 (p1 > 1/2), at least if preferences are
sufficiently random relative to the step size .
Intuitively, if p1 < 1/2, then an individual is more likely to start the grid search
in a standard BDM-task with an amount x that is higher than the expected value of
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Fig. 5 Monte Carlo simulation of median prices for lottery L(70,p1;0,1 − p1) when preferences are
represented by the random utility function u(x) = x1−r /(1−r), r ∼ N(0.2,0.4) and prices are determined
by a grid search with step size  = 1 CHF
the lottery. If preferences are sufficiently stochastic relative to the step size , this
individual is then also more likely to end the grid search at an amount higher than the
expected value of the lottery. The reverse holds for lotteries with p1 > 1/2. Thus, a
simple model of stochastic pricing explains both the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
and the systematic discrepancies between elicited prices in standard and restricted
BDM-tasks that we observed in our experiment.
For example, Fig. 5 shows the median certainty equivalent and a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation of the median selling prices for lottery L(70,p1;0,1 − p1) when probability
p1 is varied between 0 and 1. We assume that every preference relation is represented
by a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(x) = x1−r/(1 − r). We assume
that the coefficient r is normally distributed with mean 0.2 and standard deviation
0.4. The price for the lottery is determined by a simple grid search with the step size
 = 1 CHF. For each value of probability p1 we conducted 104 simulations of prices
in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. The median values of the simulated prices are
shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 5 shows that median prices in a standard BDM-task are systematically
higher (lower) than median prices in a restricted BDM-task for lotteries with p1 <
1/2 (p1 > 1/2). The reason for the different prices is not that subjects face different
compound lotteries in the two tasks. Instead, the reason is that the monetary amounts
that are compared to the lottery are drawn from different intervals. Additionally, our
model of stochastic lottery pricing explains the risk-seeking (risk-averse) decisions
in standard BDM-pricing tasks for lotteries with a low (high) probability of a gain al-
though preferences in this example are captured by a random expected utility model.
We estimate the proposed model of stochastic pricing on our experimental data.
We assume that the preferences of every subject are represented by a constant relative
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risk aversion utility function u(x) = x1−r/(1 − r) with coefficient r being normally
distributed with mean μ and standard deviation σ . Note that in this case, the proba-
bility that a subject chooses lottery L(x1,p1;0,1 − p1) over amount x ∈ [0, x1] for
sure is
Pr{L  x} =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, x = 0
μ,σ (1 + logx1/x p1), x ∈ (0, x1)
0, x = x1
(1)
where μ,σ (.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribu-
tion with mean μ and standard deviation σ . The probability that a subject chooses
amount x over lottery L is Pr(x  L) = 1 − Pr(L  x), where Pr(L  x) is defined
in (1).
If a subject starts the sequence of hypothetical binary comparisons from amount x,
then the likelihood that this subject reveals selling price z is approximated by
P˜r(x, z) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Pr(L  x) × · · · × Pr(L  x + k) · Pr(min{x + (k + 1),x1}  L),
x < z
Pr(x  L) × · · · × Pr(x − m  L) · Pr(L  max{x − (m + 1),0}),
x ≥ z
where k ∈ {0,1, . . .} is the highest number such that x + k < z, m ∈ {0,1, . . .} is the
highest number such that x − m ≥ z and  is the step size of the grid search. For
every subject, random utility parameters μ and σ are estimated to maximize the total
log-likelihood
LL =
15∑
i=1
ln
⎛
⎝ 1
xi1/ + 1
xi1/+1∑
j=1
P˜r((j − 1),DiS)
⎞
⎠
+
15∑
i=1
ln
⎛
⎝ 1
(x¯i − xi)/ + 1
(x¯i−xi )/+1∑
j=1
P˜r((j − 1),DiR)
⎞
⎠
where the step size  is taken to be 10% of the interval of feasible prices i.e.  =
x1/10 in the standard BDM-task and  = (x¯ − x)/10 in the restricted BDM-task.
Across all 60 subjects, median estimated parameters turned out to be μ = −0.86 and
σ = 1.46.
To compare the fit of the stochastic pricing model with that of RDEU, we run
a Monte Carlo simulation where we use the estimated parameters of the stochastic
pricing model to generate minimum selling prices. For each subject and each deci-
sion we run 104 simulations with the estimated random utility parameters μ and σ
and the step size  = 10%. We find that simulated mean prices are close to the prices
predicted by RDEU. For 28 out of 60 subjects (46.7%), the correlation coefficient be-
tween simulated mean prices from the stochastic pricing model and prices predicted
by RDEU is higher than 0.95, which indicates that two models make nearly identical
predictions.
The fit of the stochastic pricing model is similar to that of RDEU. If we compare
SSE for the stochastic pricing model with SSE for the RDEU prediction, 29 out of
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60 subjects (48.3%) have a lower SSE for the stochastic pricing model. However, the
difference between the SSE is small. For 18 subjects, the difference of the SSE of the
two models is less than 5%. Among the remaining subjects, 20 (22) subjects have a
lower SSE for the stochastic pricing model (for RDEU). Thus, the stochastic pricing
model explains the experimental results about as well as RDEU, when RDEU takes
compound lotteries into account.
2.5 Out-of-sample prediction
Both RDEU and the stochastic pricing model achieve a similar goodness of fit when
they are estimated on the complete data set (prices stated in standard and restricted
BDM-tasks). However, as economists, we are ultimately interested in how good mod-
els predict decisions. Therefore, we also compare the two models by the quality of
their out-of sample predictions. For every subject, we estimate the parameters of both
models using only the elicited prices from the standard BDM-task. Then we use the
estimated parameters to predict the minimum selling price that this subject states in
the restricted BDM-task. Note that we can not estimate parameters using only prices
from the restricted BDM-task. If subjects state the bound in the restricted BDM-task,
then parameters can not be determined if we do not have information about the price
that they state in the standard BDM-task.
We estimate RDEU separately for each subject using the elicited prices from the
standard BDM-task and utility function u(x) = xα and probability weighting func-
tion w(p) = pγ /(pγ + (1 − p)γ )1/γ . The coefficients α and γ are estimated to
minimize the weighted sum of squared errors SSE = ∑15i=1[(xiS − DiS)/xi1]2, where
DiS is the price that a subject stated for lottery i in a standard BDM-task and xiS
is the corresponding prediction of RDEU (as described in Sect. 2.3). Given the
estimated parameters αˆ and γˆ we compute the predicted selling price for lottery
i in a restricted BDM-task xiR(αˆ, γˆ ) as described in Sect. 2.3. Given these pre-
dicted prices we compute the sum of squared errors for the RDEU prediction, i.e.,
SSE = ∑15i=1[(xiR(αˆ, γˆ ) − DiR)/xi1]2.
We estimate the proposed model of stochastic pricing separately for each subject
using the elicited prices from the standard BDM-task and utility function u(x) =
x1−r/(1 − r) where coefficient r is normally distributed with mean μ and standard
deviation σ . For every subject, random utility parameters μ and σ are estimated to
maximize log-likelihood LL = ∑15i=1 ln( 1xi1/+1
∑xi1/+1
j=1 P˜r((j − 1),DiS)) where
the step size  is 10% of the interval of feasible prices and P˜r((j − 1),DiS) is de-
fined as in Sect. 2.4. For each subject and each lottery we then run 104 simulations of
prices stated in the restricted BDM-task given the estimated random utility parame-
ters μˆ and σˆ and the step size  = 10%. Taking the mean values x¯iR(μˆ, σˆ ) of these
104 Monte Carlo simulations, we compute the sum of squared errors for the model
of stochastic pricing, i.e., SSE = ∑15i=1[(x¯iR(μˆ, σˆ ) − DiR)/xi1]2.
A comparison of the sum of squared errors for predicted prices in restricted BDM-
tasks clearly shows that the stochastic pricing model predicts prices more accurately.
For 39 out of 60 subjects (65%) the model of stochastic pricing has a lower sum of
squared errors than RDEU. For 26 subjects (43%) the sum of squared errors of the
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stochastic pricing model is at least 20% smaller than the sum of squared errors of
the RDEU prediction. But only for 8 subjects (13%) the sum of squared errors of
the RDEU prediction is at least 20% smaller than the sum of squared errors of the
prediction of the stochastic pricing model. Therefore, the model of stochastic pricing
appears to have a better out-of-sample forecasting power than RDEU.
3 Conclusion
We study lottery pricing under the BDM procedure. We compare prices that are
elicited in standard BDM-tasks with those elicited in restricted BDM-tasks. The two
tasks differ in one important aspect. In a standard BDM-task, subjects can state prices
between the highest and the lowest outcome of the lottery. In a restricted BDM-task,
subjects can state prices that lie within a smaller interval that is symmetric around
the expected value of the lottery. The interval imposes a lower (upper) bound on
prices for lotteries when the probability p of a gain is higher (lower) than 0.5. We
observe strong range effects—a highly significant discrepancy between the prices for
the same lottery in standard and restricted BDM-tasks. Subjects state systematically
higher (lower) prices in the restricted BDM-task for lotteries with p > 0.5 (p < 0.5).
Our results have several implications for future research. It appears that prices
elicited in standard BDM-tasks are systematically too high (low) if the chance of a
gain is low (high). This supports recent findings of Bateman et al. (2007), who argue
that some empirical anomalies such as the preference reversal phenomenon may be
an artefact of the BDM-task and that their frequency is significantly reduced if lottery
prices are elicited through different techniques.
The proposed model of stochastic pricing provides a behavioral foundation for
range effects that are frequently observed in experiments. The discrepancy between
prices in standard and restricted BDM-tasks can be interpreted as the result of range
effects. The stochastic pricing model provides a simple and intuitive explanation for
why we observe a range effect. The range effect occurs because the restriction on the
interval of feasible prices affects the set of feasible prices that may be compared to
the lottery in a sequence of binary comparisons.
Finally, our experimental results have important methodological implications for
experimental economics. Inconsistencies in minimum selling prices elicited in stan-
dard and restricted BDM-tasks indicate that a classical BDM procedure is highly sen-
sitive to range effects. Hence, experimental economists should be aware that prices
elicited in the BDM procedure are distorted by range effects and they should take
this bias into account. By using the restricted BDM-task a researcher can reduce such
range affects.
Additionally, the restricted BDM-task provides higher incentives for reporting true
certainty equivalents. If a subject misreports his true price by the same amount in
standard and restricted BDM-tasks, his expected utility is 0.5/min{p,1 − p} times
lower in the restricted BDM-task compared to the standard BDM-task (provided that
the true price lies within the feasible interval). However, the restricted BDM-task has
an obvious drawback—a researcher cannot observe minimum selling prices outside
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the (preselected) feasible interval. Moreover, the restricted BDM-task may drift sub-
jects to a risk-neutral behavior. Thus, we would not recommend using the restricted
BDM-task as a superior method over the standard BDM procedure.
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